

# BSM906

# Economic Environment of Business

Lecture 4  
Contracts and norms

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# What have we learnt so far?

- Transactions form the core of all economic activities
- Transactions require trust between parties that are involved in these transactions
  - Hold up problem
- Trust can be facilitated by a legal system that ensures the existence of clearly defined property rights, and enforcement of contracts that permit the exchange of these property rights
  - Problem with the Coase theorem
- The exact nature of these legal systems are influenced both by history, in the form of legal origin, as well as by politics and coalitions
  - Differences in corporate governance structures

# Interactions in the absence of trust

## A primer

		Others	
		Low	High
Company A	Low	(10, 10)	(7, 12)
	High	(12, 7)	(9, 9)

- Each company can choose to produce a lot (*high*) or restrict the supply (*low*) of the product
- In the absence of trust, each is *independently* likely to choose *high* and that would be perfectly rational
- The outcome will be unchanged if this interaction is repeated a finite number of times, but it will change if it is repeated infinitely
  - Grim strategy & Tit-for-tat strategy

# Resolving the hold-up problem privately

## Infinite interactions

- United States
  - Design-intensive products procured internally or design provided by producer of final product
  - Physical assets that are key to the production of the intermediate goods are owned by the producer
- Japan
  - The producers procure from the market, with the suppliers investing in the designs of the key products
  - Such physical assets are also owned by suppliers

The Japanese contracting environment:

- Few suppliers (i.e., competition with low monitoring cost)
- Frequent repeated interaction (i.e., “infinitely” repeated game)

# Resolving the hold-up problem privately

## Nature of the market

- Nucor – American steel manufacturer operating mini mills
  - Mini mills generally backward integrated
  - Nucor buys scrap from DJJ
  - Contract:
    - (a) cost-plus pricing based on cost accounting
    - (b) six-month warning period for ending agreement
  - Puzzle: Hold up possible, but not observed
- Boeing and Airbus contracting with Rolls Royce, Pratt and Whitney and GE

# Contracting under informational asymmetry

## Hidden information & adverse selection

- Lemons' problem
  - In the used cars' market, there are two types of cars: good cars worth £5000, and bad cars worth £1000
  - Buyer cannot distinguish between good and bad cars, but knows that 50% of the cars are good and 50% are bad
  - It can be shown that in that case there would be no transactions in the used car market (Why?)
- Application
  - Credit market failure
  - Freezing up of the interbank market during the financial crisis
- Solution
  - Signalling such as collateral in the credit market or a degree in a labour market

# Contracting under informational asymmetry

## Hidden action & moral hazard – I

- Nature of the problem
  - Certain aspects of contract cannot be measured
  - Are the parties involved in a transaction acting in good faith?
- Application
  - Will a worker put in his/her best effort?
  - Will a franchisee manage cost effectively?
  - Will someone taking out an insurance manage risks effectively?
- Solution
  - Contracting on measurable items, e.g., on revenues as opposed to profits
  - Risk sharing, e.g., a flat franchise fee leaving the cost related risks to the franchisee, and a deductible in an insurance contract


# Contracting under informational asymmetry

## Hidden action & moral hazard – II

- In a context of free choice, the principal has to make the contract acceptable to the agent
  - Examples of principal: employer, insurance company
  - Examples of agent: worker, individual buying insurance
- Key considerations
  - We use the example of the employer and the worker
  - **Participation constraint:** The contract being offered should provide the worker an expected payoff that is at least as much as his payoff from an alternative employment, including self employment
  - **Incentive compatibility constraint:** The contract being offered should ensure that payoff for the worker is higher, on average, if he puts in a lot of effort, than if he puts in little effort
- Key factors
  - **Risk aversion:** how much risk would the agent be willing to bear?
  - **Market structure:** what is his payoff for the best alternative?

# Connecting the dots

## Economic environment and the firm



# An alternative to formal contracting

## Advantages of informal contracting

- No cost of *ex ante* verification
  - Adverse selection
  - Signalling
- No cost of *ex post* verification
  - Acceptance of “good faith”
  - No cost of writing formal contracts
  - No cost of monitoring
  - Negligible private cost of enforcement

# An alternative to formal contracting

## Nature of informal contracting

- Mechanisms
  - Reputation loss
  - Social ostracism
  - Group membership
- Challenges
  - Collective action, especially in large groups
  - Social heterogeneity

# An alternative to formal contracting

## Rational egoist vs. norm user

- It is well understood that contracting for collective action is difficult, especially in large and heterogeneous groups
  - In a finitely repeated game, the dominant strategy should be zero voluntary contribution
- Evidence suggests that while there is limited free riding, individual voluntary contributions are generally much more than zero
- Laboratory experiments
  - Those who believe that others will cooperate are more likely to contribute (conditional cooperators)
  - Face to face interactions increase cooperation
  - Some will spend personal resources to punish those who are not cooperating (willing punishers)

# An alternative to formal contracting

## Social norms

- Humans hard wired to think in a domain-specific way; trust is an important part of any transactional relationship
- In an anonymous finitely repeated game, it is always best for a rational egoist to choose non-cooperation, even though payoff from it would be low
- If there is a mix of rational egoists and conditional cooperators, the latter should eventually dominate and get higher payoffs, affecting the behaviour of economic agents in the long run
- External rule based contracting can crowd out norm based contracting, and the outcome may not be good if the rule based contracting cannot fully mitigate opportunism or agency conflicts

# An alternative to formal contracting

## Designing norm based contracts

- Clear boundary rules (knowledge of who is “in” and who is “out”, and hence with whom to cooperate)
- Rules developed by the contracting parties themselves as opposed to external agents (including local elites)
- Presence of a monitoring mechanism with monitors who are accountable to the contracting parties
- Use of graduated sanctions that vary with the degree of the deviation from the norms